유성환, 한동국, 한재승,

Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 25-35, 2월. 2025
10.13089/JKIISC.2025.35.1.25, Full Text:
Keywords: Side-Channel Analysis, Korean Post-Quantum Cryptography, Single-Trace Attack, Countermeasure
Abstract

Recently, with the development of quantum computers, active research on quantum-resistant cryptography (PQC) has been conducted. In Korea, the domestic PQC National Competition (KPQC) has started in 2022, and eight algorithms have been selected as second-round candidates and are being evaluated. This paper presents two new simple power analysis vulnerabilities and the possibility of secret key information leakage using SMAUG-T, a lattice-based PKE/KEM algorithm. The SMAUG-T algorithm implements polynomial multiplication according to the sparse ternary characteristic of the secret key coefficients. This paper shows that the polynomial multiplication structure does not satisfy constant time and that power differences occur depending on the value of the secret key coefficients. In addition, we propose a method to recover the number of 1, 0, and -1 among the coefficients of each secret key polynomial with a single power waveform through the vulnerability, and showed that the secret key information was recovered in an ARM Cortex-M4-based MCU environment. Additionally, we proposed a countermeasure technique and experimentally verified the safety of the countermeasure technique by performing the proposed simple power analysis attack in the same environment. We also evaluated the performance by measuring the number of cycles and the overhead in memory.

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