An Anti-Virus Vaccine Selection Model Based on Stackelberg Game

Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 135-144, Feb. 2009
10.13089/JKIISC.2009.19.1.135, Full Text:
Keywords: Network Security, Stackelberg Game, game theory
Abstract

This paper deals with an information security problem that involves the strategies of both an attacker and an administrator of a web-based system. A game-theoretic model for the problem, based on an Stackelberg game environment, is presented. In the model, the administrator selects a set of anti-virus vaccines to cope with potential system attackers and the intruder chooses attacking modes that are most effective against the administrator's chosen set of vaccines. Moreover, the model considers a number of practical constraints, such as a budget limit on the vaccine purchase and a limit on the system performance. In addition, two different scenario analyses are provided, based on the results of the proposed model applied to a simulated pseudo-real-world data.

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Cite this article
[IEEE Style]
S. Sung and I. Choi, "An Anti-Virus Vaccine Selection Model Based on Stackelberg Game," Journal of The Korea Institute of Information Security and Cryptology, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 135-144, 2009. DOI: 10.13089/JKIISC.2009.19.1.135.

[ACM Style]
Si-Il Sung and In-Chan Choi. 2009. An Anti-Virus Vaccine Selection Model Based on Stackelberg Game. Journal of The Korea Institute of Information Security and Cryptology, 19, 1, (2009), 135-144. DOI: 10.13089/JKIISC.2009.19.1.135.