A Strong RFID Authentication Protocol Based on Synchronized Secret Information

Vol. 17, No. 5, pp. 99-110, Oct. 2007
10.13089/JKIISC.2007.17.5.99, Full Text:
Keywords: RPID System, Authentication Protocol, Indistinguishability, Backward untraceability, Forward unraceability
Abstract

Lee et al. recently proposed an RFID mutual authentication scheme based on synchronized secret information. However, we found that their protocol is vulnerable to a spoofing attack in which an adversary can impersonate a legal tag to the reader by sending a malicious random number. To remedy this vulnerability, we propose two RFID authentication protocols which are secure against all possible threats including backward and forward traceability. Furthermore, one of the two proposed protocols requires only three hash operations(but, $[m/2]{\cdot}2+3$ operations in resynchronization state, m is the number of tags) in the database to authenticate a tag, hence it is well suitable fur large scale RFID systems.

Statistics
Show / Hide Statistics

Statistics (Cumulative Counts from December 1st, 2017)
Multiple requests among the same browser session are counted as one view.
If you mouse over a chart, the values of data points will be shown.


Cite this article
[IEEE Style]
J. Ha, J. Ha, J. Park, S. Moon, H. Kim, "A Strong RFID Authentication Protocol Based on Synchronized Secret Information," Journal of The Korea Institute of Information Security and Cryptology, vol. 17, no. 5, pp. 99-110, 2007. DOI: 10.13089/JKIISC.2007.17.5.99.

[ACM Style]
Jae-Cheol Ha, Jung-Hoon Ha, Jea-Hoon Park, Sang-Jae Moon, and Hwan-Koo Kim. 2007. A Strong RFID Authentication Protocol Based on Synchronized Secret Information. Journal of The Korea Institute of Information Security and Cryptology, 17, 5, (2007), 99-110. DOI: 10.13089/JKIISC.2007.17.5.99.