GPS 스푸핑 공격 취약점 분석 및 실증: 상용 드론을 대상으로

Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 431-437, 6월. 2024
10.13089/JKIISC.2024.34.3.431, Full Text:
Keywords: Drone, Wireless Communication, GPS spoofing attack, vulnerability Analysis
Abstract

Drones in the contemporary landscape have transcended their initial public utility, expanding into various industries and making significant inroads into the private sector. The majority of commercially available drones are presently equipped with GPS receivers to relay location signals from artificial satellites, aiming to inform users about the drone's whereabouts. However, a notable drawback arises from the considerable distance over which these location signals travel, resulting in a weakened signal intensity. This limitation introduces vulnerabilities, allowing for the possibility of location manipulation and jamming attacks if the drone receives a stronger signal than the intended location signal from satellites. Thus, this paper focuses on the safety assessment of drones relying on GPS-based location acquisition and addresses potential vulnerabilities in wireless communication scenarios. Targeting commercial drones, the paper analyzes and empirically demonstrates the feasibility of GPS spoofing attacks. The outcomes of this study are anticipated to serve as foundational experiments for conducting more realistic vulnerability analysis and safety evaluations.

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Cite this article
[IEEE Style]
윤진서, 이경률, 김민재, "Analysis and Demonstration of GPS Spoofing Attack: Based on Commercial Drones," Journal of The Korea Institute of Information Security and Cryptology, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 431-437, 2024. DOI: 10.13089/JKIISC.2024.34.3.431.

[ACM Style]
윤진서, 이경률, and 김민재. 2024. Analysis and Demonstration of GPS Spoofing Attack: Based on Commercial Drones. Journal of The Korea Institute of Information Security and Cryptology, 34, 3, (2024), 431-437. DOI: 10.13089/JKIISC.2024.34.3.431.